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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROD C. SLATER,
Petitioner & Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 930443-CA

STATE OF UTAH,
Dept. of Human Services,
CINDY HAAG, Director, and
CHRIS MEGALONKIS, H.E.A.T.
Supervisor, etal.,
Respondents & Appellees,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Petition for judicial review of administrative order.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court Order in Civil 920903097CV, dated
June 9, 1993, reads as follows:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Peti-

tioner's Motion to Dismiss is granted and the action herein is
dismissed with prejudice."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
To vacate dismissal with prejudice and order the Court below
to grant Appellant's Motion to Dismiss his Petition without prejudice .

-1-

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 1, 1992, Appellant filed a Petition for Judicial Review
of Administrative Order in Third District Court seeking redress from
an adverse Decision and Order issued by the Office of Administrative
Hearings on April 30, 1992.

The following is a summary of the pro-

ceedings which took place thereafter in this case:
6/22/92 Filed: Answer to Petition
7/16/92 Filed: Motion for Scheduling Conference
7/22/92 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision
8/17/92
5/7/93

ICC

scheduled for 9/14/92 at 1115 A in room M with JSS

Order to Show Cause —
OSC

5/20/93 ORL

No. 1

scheduled for 5/19/93 at 0900 A in room A with TEM
scheduled for 6/7/93 at 9:00 A in room A with TEM

Filed: Motion to Dismiss
6/7/93

Filed: Minute Entry —

Court Orders Petitioner's Motion to

Dismiss Granted with Prejudice
Case Judgment is Other
Case Disposition is Dismissed
6/9/93

Filed: Order

7/8/93

931300202

Notice of Appeal fee

160.00

Filed: Notice of Appeal
Filed: Undertaking Bond No. 1097678
7/9/93

Note:

Sent Copy of Notice to Court of Appeals

7/19/93 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals No. 930443-CA
End of the Docket Report for this case.
The foregoing entries are the dates and filings taken from the
Docket Report in this case for the entire period it remained in
Third District Court—from 6/1/92 until the final Order was filed
on 6/9/93.

These docket entries clearly indicate that little or

no litigation of any real consequence took place throughout these
proceedings until Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss his Petition.
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There was no discovery, no admissions, no interrogatories, no motions
or pleadings of any kind that could be considered a burden on the
Respondents.

The only response expected from the Respondents was

their Answer, which was filed on 6/22/92, and a request for a Scheduling Conference subsequently held on 9/14/92.
This case never reached the merits.
pleadings other than its Answer.

The State submitted no

Again, the facts of the case make

it clear that the Respondents were under no burden or any pressure
from Appellant throughout these proceedings that would justify the
Court ordering a dismissal with prejudice.
ARGUMENT
Point I
The record in this case brings into focus the fact that the
Court-ordered Dismissal with prejudice was unreasonable and unwarranted.

Whenever it becomes clear that a trial Court has,

without just cause, issued a decree that is too severe, unsound and
contrary to both precedent and principle, the remedy on appeal for
such an abuse of judicial discretion must be the reversal of such
a decree.
POINT II
At the outset, it should be stated that the sole issue before
this Court is whether the record indicates that Appellant's conduct
in this case could, in any way, be construed as a refusal to obey
Court orders, or any other form of misconduct so flagrant that it
would warrant such a harsh judicial measure as a dismissal with
prejudice.
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Moving to case law, 8 of the cases cited by Appellant in support of his position in this appeal are Utah cases.

Citing the

most recent of these cases first, this Court upheld the decision
of the Third District Court wherein the action had been dismissed
for a failure to prosecute, not once, but twice, involving litigation between the same two parties dating back to April of 1983,
a period exceeding 8 years!

See Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State

Univ., 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah App.1991).
The above lawsuit, for a breach of contract by a corporation
against a State-owned university and other departments and divisions
of State government, had to have taken at least a moderate amount
of time, money and effort to defend.

And yet the trial Court dis-

missed the plaintiff's action without prejudice —
twice —
peals.

not once, but

which appeared to cause some concern to the Court of ApSpecifically whether, under the circumstances, Meadow Fresh

Farms, Inc., would be at liberty to file suit for a third time based
on the same claims against the same State defendants.
Although the appellate opinion comprehensively covers the Meadow
Fresh matter, including numerous citations in support of its decision
to uphold the Order of the trial Court to dismiss the case for failure
to prosecute, the fact remains that the dismissal was still without
prejudice, with no suggestion whatsoever that the case should be remanded with instructions to dismiss the suit "with" prejudice.
lower Court Order of Dismissal without prejudice would stand.

The
On

the possibility of the Meadow Fresh Plaintiffs filing a third action,
the Court of Appeals remained non-committal, stating: "We decline
to render an opinion on the propriety of refiling an action more
-4-

than once pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40."
There are certain similarities in Bills v. U.S., 857 F.2d 1404
(10th Cir.1988) to the Meadow Fresh case.

Plaintiff-Appellant Bills,

who was suing the Federal Government for damages, but failed to follow certain Court orders, causing too many delays over several years,
resulted in the U.S. District Court for Utah dismissing the case
for lack of prosecution.
had no alternative —

Once again, the Defendants (United States),

time and federal funds would have to be spent

for a legal defense against Mr. Bills.

Nevertheless, when Federal

Judge Aldon Anderson finally dismissed the case, the Dismissal was
without prejudice —

upheld on appeal to the 10th Circuit.

Turning to Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie A s s o c , 728 P.2d
1017 (Utah S.Ct.1986), the Utah Supreme Court said;
"While the court below properly exercised its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's action for failing
to comply with Rule 19(a), it was improper to do so
with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice under Rule
41(b) is a harsh and permanent remedy when it precludes a presentation of a plaintiff's claims on
their merits. Our rules of procedure are intended
to encourage the adjudication of disputes on their
merits."" (Emphasis added)
"Not having considered the merits of plaintiff's
claims, there was no reason for the court to dismiss with prejudice and prevent future consideration of the claims should the defect be corrected.
The trial court abused its discretion by entering
its Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice." (Emphasis added. See 728 P.2d at p.1020)
In Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah S.Ct.1977), the Appellants
are represented by Salt Lake civil rights attorney Brian Barnard. Utah
Supreme Court Justice Wilkins, in writing the opinion for the Court,
quoted Justice Crockett from the text of the opinion in Westinghouse
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Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876
(Utah S.Ct.1975), and cases cited therein:
"It is not to be doubted that in order to handle
the business of the court with efficiency and expedition the trial court should have a reasonable latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a party fails to move forward according to
the rules and the directions of the court, without
justifiable excuse. ...Whether there is such justifiable excuse is to be determined by considering
more factors than merely the length of time since
the suit was filed. Some consideration should be
given to the conduct of both parties, and to the
opportunity each has had to move the case forward
. . . also what difficulty or prejudice may have
been caused to the other side; and most important,
whether injustice may result from the dismissal."
(Emphasis added. See 561 P.2d at 1076)
The following Utah case was in litigation almost 5 years.
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah S.Ct.1977).

See

In writing

for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Ellett began:
"The
Did the
ing the
lack of

sole issue presented on this appeal is this:
trial court abuse its discretion in dismissplaintiff's complaint with prejudice for
prosecution?"

Later, the Chief Justice refers to Crystal Lime & Cement Co.
v. Robbins, 335 P.2d 624 (Utah S.Ct.1959), in quoting from that
opinion:
"Since any party to this action could have obtained the relief to which it was entitled at any
time it had wanted but both parties chose to dally
for a number of years, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant respondents1 motion
to dismiss with prejudice." (571 P.2d at p.1369)
Westinghouse (See citation above) is a case that has been cited
extensively throughout Utah law books.
Fresh case and Polk v. Ivers, supra.

For example, see the Meadow

And on occasion, Westinghouse

has also been cited as a sound authority regarding abuse of dis-
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cretion as it relates to dismissals in numerous other jurisdictions
as well.

One of the most important passages, among several to be

found in the Westinghouse opinion, reads as follows:
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases with
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in
order to keep them up to date. But it is even
more important to keep in mind that the very reason
for the existence of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice
between them." (Emphasis added. See 544 P.2d at 879)
Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 335 P.2d 624 (Utah S.Ct.
1959), is yet another case that has been cited repeatedly throughout Utah's recent case histories regarding the subject of dismissals and abuse of discretion.

Quoting from the opening summary

to the case on page 624 of the Reporter:
"...The Supreme Court, Wade, J., held that defendants were not harassed and annoyed by plaintiff's
failure to draw and present to trial court findings of facts, conclusions of law. . . and it was
an abuse of discretion for trial court about eight
years later to grant defendants' motion to dismiss action with prejudice."
The eighth and final Utah case is Wright v. Howe, 150 P. 956
(Utah S.Ct.1915), a very interesting old case to study, wherein certain legal principles firmly upheld in 1915 are still adhered to
in appellate decisions today.

In 1915 the Utah Supreme Court said:

"The defendants had the same right to press the
action to trial that the plaintiff had, and if they
were willing to permit it to remain untried, and
expecially in the absence of any showing of prejudice, they cannot complain." At page 956.
"Merely failing to promptly prosecute an action
is not sufficient to show prejudice. This is especially true where the defendant may himself press
the action to trial. Appellant could have done
that at any time within the three years the action
was pending. This court, in a number of decisions,
has clearly indicated that it is the policy of the
law to have cases tried and determined upon the
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merits whenever such a course is possible, and where
it does not clearly invade the rights of one of the
parties." (Emphasis added at p. 959)
The foregoing represents a basic legal opinion that is right
on point, and as sound now as when it was written nearly 80 years
ago.
There are many other cases that support Appellant's position
in this appeal.

They begin in alphabetical order with Bruce v.

Grace Hospital, 293 N.W. 2d 654 (Mich. App.1980) where the plaintiffs were granted a dismissal "without" prejudice even though the
case had been in litigation for several years.
stood an appeal by the defendants.

The decision with-

The Michigan Court of Appeals

cites Wright & Miller in support of its decision.
#2:

Quoting headnote

"Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting plaintiffs1 motion to dismiss without
prejudice in order to allow plaintiffs, who had
substituted counsel, sufficient time in which to
obtain second evaluation of their medical malpractice action, even though action had been pending
for over five years and had been adjourned several times at plaintiffs' request." At p. 654.
Conafay v. Wyeth Laboratories, 841 F. 2d 417 (D.C. Cir.1988)

represents a clear and concise, well-written decision discussing
relevant issues that closely relate to the present case.

The D.C.

Circuit said this:
"Granting voluntary dismissal would mean that
appellee would lose an opportunity for a favorable final disposition of the case, but that is
not important as long as appellee suffers no legal prejudice from dismissal." At p. 420.
"For these reasons, the court is convinced
the case is an appropriate one for voluntary
dismissal. The case is remanded to the district
court with instructions to dismiss it without
prejudice." At p. 421.
Davis v. Operation Amigo, Inc. , 378 F. 2d 101 (10th Cir.1967) had
-8-

its origin in U.S. District Court in our sister State of Wyoming where
the plaintiffs appealed an adverse decision to the 10th Circuit in
Denver.

There, the U.S. Court of Appeals stated:

". . .A dismissal, with prejudice, is a harsh sanction and should be resorted to only in extreme cases.
No precise rule can be laid down as to what circumstances justify a dismissal for failure to prosecute
but the procedural history of each case must be examined in order to make such determination. The
judge must be ever mindful that the policy of the
law favors the hearing of a litigant's claim upon
the merits." (In the foregoing passage, the 10th
Circuit also refers to Meeker v. Rizley, 324 F.2d
269. See 378 F.2d at p.103. Emphasis added)
In Dome Laboratories v. Farrell, 599 P.2d 152 (Alaska S.Ct.1979),
the Plaintiffs (Farrells) sued the Defendants (Dome Laboratories)
for medical malpractice, then decided to file a Motion to Dismiss
their case without prejudice —
appeal.

which was granted —

and upheld on

In addition, the Supreme Court of Alaska gave further cre-

dence to its decision favoring the Plaintiffs when stating:
11

. . . the lack of any demonstrable prejudice to appellants, persuades us that a satisfactory basis has
been demonstrated for concluding that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
motion for voluntary dismissal." At p.159.
". . . Given the particular factual circumstances of
this case, we hold that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to award attorney's
fees to appellant as a term or condition of its grant
of the Farrells' motion for voluntary dismissal."
At p.160.
Douthitt v. Garrison, 444 N.E.2d 1068 (Ohio App.1981), is another
relevant case where the plaintiffs appealed and won a reversal of a
lower Court Order which had denied the plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss
their complaint without prejudice.

The Ohio Court of Appeals said:

" . . . A refusal by the court to consider any equities
of the plaintiff is a denial of full and complete exercise of judicial discretion; recent cases have held that

-9-

equities of the plaintiff should be given whatever
weight they deserve. Wright & Miller, supra. While
we rocognize that this situation has been brought
about by the actions of plaintiffs' counsel, nonetheless, we believe that justice requires under
these circumstances that the plaintiffs be granted
their full day in court." (Emphasis added at p.1071)
Also see the pertinent paragraph under headnote #7:
"Trial court erred when it failed to grant plaintiffs1 request for a dismissal without prejudice of
their action arising out of an automobile accident
where there was no prejudice to defendant other than
the prospect of a second lawsuit, and plaintiffs
would suffer great prejudice since their main causes
of action would be forever barred. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 41(A)(2). (Emphasis added at p.1068)
The next citation includes a well-balanced, comprehensive discussion concerning attorney fees, how much, and under what circumstances they should, or should not, be paid.

See Dunn v. Fred A. Mik-

kelson, Inc., 276 N.W.2d 748 (Wis. S.Ct.1979) wherein a motion for
a voluntary dismissal without prejudice was granted to the plaintiffs
and upheld on appeal even though the case had apparently been in litigation nearly 3 years.

In reference to attorney fees, the Supreme

Court of Wisconsin said:
"We conclude that factors to be considered in
assessing attorney fees against a plaintiff in a
voluntary dismissal include (1) the utility of
the work performed for future proceedings should
the plaintiff reinstate the action; (2) the good
faith of the plaintiff; (3) the stage to which
the proceedings had progressed; (4) the complexity of the work performed; (5) whether it would
result in undue hardship on the plaintiff; and
(6) any factors which would result in unique prejudice to the defendant." At p.754.
The next case, adjudicated in the 5th Circuit, has been cited
numerous times in many jurisdictions throughout the country.

Refer-

ring to an abuse of discretion, Judge Wisdom, writing for the U.S.
Court of Appeals declared: ". . . In exercising its
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discretion the court follows the traditional principle that dismissal should be allowed unless the
defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice
other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.
It is no bar to dismissal that plaintiff may obtain some tactical advantage thereby." (Quoting
from Wright & Miller at p.368. Emphasis added)
"The record does not disclose any prejudice to the
defendant, had a voluntary dismissal been granted,
other than the annoyance of a second litigation
upon the same subject matter."
"Accordingly, we hold that the district court
exceeded the bounds of judicial discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. We reverse
and remand with instructions that the case be reinstated. " (At p.369 with emphasis added)
The foregoing excerpts are from the opinion in Durham v. Florida
East Coast Railway Company, 385 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.1967).
Another 5th Circuit case often cited in related decisions is
Flaksa v. Little River Marine Construction Co., 389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.
1968).

Quoting the Court:

". . . The exercise of the authority is discretionary, and is subject to review for abuse of discretion. Dismissal of an action with prejudice and
entry of judgment by default are drastic renedies
which should be used only in extreme situations,. ."
(At p.887. Emphasis added).
"This Court, while recognizing and enforcing
the exercise of the power of final disposition
of litigation as a sanction in some cases, has
adopted the view that such action is too harsh
except in extreme circumstances. It has generally followed the more modern tenor appearing
in the following quotation from the opinion in
the recent case of Durham v. Florida East Coast
Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, where Judge Wisdom, after
recognizing the inherent power now under discussion, said: "* * * The decided cases, while noting that dismissal is a discretionary matter,
have generally permitted it only in the face of
a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct
by the plaintiff * * *" (At p.888. Em. added)
Several sound legal points are discussed in Flynn v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., Inc., 471 N.E.2d 408 (Mass. S.Ct.1977) that sup-
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port Appellant's position in the instant case.

See headnotes #5 and

#9 in the Northeastern Reporter:
"Delay of less than two years from plaintiff's
filing of suit to plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal was not so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse, particularly in light of absence of any effort of defendants to move case
along, and thus, did not require dismissal of case
with prejudice. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41(a)(1,2) . "
(At p.409)
"A plaintiff, having moved to dismiss voluntarily, and being faced with conditions he finds
too onerous, may, if he acts promptly, decline to
have action dismissed and go forward on merits.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41(a)(1,2)." (At p.410)
Kovalic v. Dec. Intern., Inc., 855 F.2d 471 (7th Cir.1988) is a
unique case in many respects and worthy of study as it relates to
the issues at hand.

Plaintiff Kovalic moved for a voluntary dismis-

sal of his age discrimination suit filed in Federal District Court,
which was readily granted even though the Federal District judge
knew that this Plaintiff had filed an identical action in State Court
and would press his case in that forum.
appeal to the 7th Circuit.

This decision was upheld on

See headnote #3:

"Prospect of facing subsequent lawsuit in state
rather than federal court does not constitute prejudice making it abuse of district court's discretion to grant plaintiff's motion to dismiss federal action without prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ.Proc.
Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A." (At p.472)
Appellant has already cited Laurie v. Ezard, 595 S.W.2d 336
(Mo. App.1980) in his Docketing Statement as a relevant case in point,
and submits this case again, quoting the following closing passages
found on p.338 of the appellate opinion in Laurie:
". . . 'But, desirable as it is that courts should
keep their dockets current, it is of greater importance that their work should be done with care and
discernment and that they should be ever diligent
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and zealous in their unremitting efforts to attain
the ends of justice.'"
"We believe here that the ends of justice will be
better served by allowing the case to proceed on its
merits rather than to be determined without the parties having an opportunity to present evidence and
to be otherwise heard."
"The order dismissing the case is reversed and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings."
LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir.1976) is another
case that has been cited in scores of dismissal actions.

LeCompte

has been referred to repeatedly because in this 5th Circuit opinion
the Court stressed the importance of the basic rights that Courts
must protect in behalf of both parties —

there must be equity, not

"legal prejudice."
In Lowe v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 897 F.2d 272 (7th Cir.1990),
we have another case that is right on point, particularly regarding
a Court's abuse of discretion:
". . . 'The district court should consider less severe sanctions than dismissal for a party's noncompliance with court orders or failure to prosecute his or her claim expeditiously, unless there
exists a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct or when less drastic sanctions have proven ineffective. '" (At p.274)
"The district court abused its discretion in
dismissing Mr. Lowe's suit and denying his motion
for a continuance. Consequently, we reverse, reinstate Mr. Lowe's action and remand. Circuit Rule
36 shall apply." (At p.275)
In McCombs v. Pittsburgh—Pes Moines Steel Company, 426 F.2d 264
(10th Cir.1970), the U.S. District Court for Colorado dismissed the
action for a failure to prosecute and Plaintiff McCombs appealed. The
10th Circuit reversed the District Court decision and remanded with
orders to reinstate the action.

The 10th Circuit quoted from its

opinion in Davis, supra, 378 F.2d 101 at 103.
-13-

(See p.266 in McCombs).

This concludes Appellant's discussion of his case citations
separately.

Time does not permit further review of each case in-

dividually.

Therefore, the remainder of Appellant's citations will

be submitted alphabetically as follows:
Meeker v. Rizley, 324 F.2d 269 (10th Cir.1963); Mely v. Morris,
409 P.2d 979 (Alaska S.Ct.1966); Ordnance Gauge Co. v. Jacquard Knitting
Machine Co., 21 F.R.D. 575 (E.D. Penn.1958); Palmer v. City of Decatur,
111., 814 F.2d 426 (7th Cir.1987); Peardon v. Chapman, 169 F.2d 909
(3rd Cir.1948); Richman v. General Motors Corporation, 437 F.2d 196
(1st Cir.1971); Stevedoring Services of America v. Armilla Intern.,
889 F.2d 919 (9th Cir.1989); Syracuse Broadcasting Corporation v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910 (2nd Cir.1959); Transit Casualty Company v. Security
Trust Company, 396 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.1968); Tyco laboratories, Inc. v.
Koppers Co. , Inc. , 627 F.2d 54 (7th Cir.1980); United States v. E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 490 (N.D. Ill. ,E .D. 1953) ; Woods v.
Murdock, 441 N.W.2d 63 (Mich. App.1989) .
Each of the foregoing cases, emanating from both State and Federal jurisdictions throughout the entire country, are closely relevant
to the instant issue, namely: abuse of judicial discretion as it relates to Dismissals.

For example, note what a Federal District Court

had to say in the Ordnance Gauge case, supra, 21 F.R.D. at p.577:
". . . The motion under Rule 41(b) was filed after
receipt of notice from the Clerk, required by the
local rule, that the case would be deemed abandoned
unless application was made to the Court. If this
application be denied, as I think it should be in
this case, the cause of action would under the rule
have to be dismissed without prejudice. It seems
anomalous and unfair that a plaintiff who, when notified of the impending dismissal of his case, moved
promptly (though unsuccessfully) to avoid the penalty, should find himself, by the defendant's belated action, in a worse position than if he had
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done nothing and permitted his action to be dismissed
without protest. "
For another opinion that is equally, if not even closer to the
issue at hand, in fact, what follows is right on the mark.

See

Peardon v. Chapman, supra, 169 F.2d at p.913:
". . . Based on the Court's first expression it
would seem that appellant anticipated nothing more
drastic than a dismissal without prejudice. With
no warning of the Court's uncommunicated change
of thought as to dismissal, she was not afforded
an opportunity of protecting her cause of action.
Under all the facts, in view of the intimation
of dismissal without prejudice and of a situation
thereafter arising less blameworthy than in the
first instance, the dismissal with prejudice of
plaintiff-appellant's cause of action was unwarranted. " (Emphasis added)
In the last two cases just cited, Ordnance Gauge and Peardon v.
Chapman, the Federal judges writing the opinions in those cases made
it clear that it is unfair for a Court to lead a litigant toward one
form of judicial action, and then suddenly impose something entirely
different, particularly when the litigant is surprised to learn that
he or she is now facing a Court-ordered sanction that is unreasonable
and far too severe.
The action taken by the Court below in the instant case is closely comparable to what took place in the two Eastern cases just discussed, Ordnance Gauge and Peardon, where the plaintiffs sought redress —

which they rightfully deserved —

and were granted.

This Court should be informed as to exactly what took place during the hearing to Show Cause held on Wednesday, May 19, 1993, followed by the Motion hearing on Monday, June 7, 1993 in Third District
Court with Judge Medley presiding.
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The Transcript (see Addendum)

covers the May 19 hearing in about one and \ pages.

First of all,

Appellant received an Order through the mail to appear before Judge
Medley on May 19 and show cause why, as the Plaintiff (Petitioner)
in a civil action that had been pending for several months, the
case was not moving forward.

Appellant responded to that Show Cause

Order and appeared on the morning of May 19 as instructed.
The Transcript of the proceedings held on the 19th makes.it
obvious that Appellant had little or no knowledge as to legal procedure regarding dismissals.

Appellant was relying almost entirely

on instructions from the Bench concerning the correct way to proceed in filing a Motion to Dismiss.

Again, the Transcript makes it

clear that here was a citizen-litigant appearing in Court, as ordered,
and simply asking the judge what the Court required of him to remove
his case from the active Court calendar.
The Transcript indicates Judge Medley saying that a "timely notice" was to be sent to the State notifying the Respondents that Appellant would be filing a Motion to Dismiss his Petition.
line 25 of the Transcript).

(See p.l,

Later, Judge Medley said, "I will give

you ten days from today to get that taken care of."

(See p.2, lines

13 & 14).
Although Appellant was given 10 days to file his Motion, he filed
it the next day, May 20, including the Notice which stated the Motion
would be heard on July 7, 1993 at 9:00 A.M.

By filing so promptly

following the Show Cause hearing, the Respondents were thus given at
least 17—18 days to respond in writing if there was any objection to
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss his Petition "without" prejudice, which
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was clearly stated in the Motion.
From what began as a very simple legal procedure, the next turn
of events began to complicate things considerably.

First, the record

will show that counsel for the Respondents did not appear at the
Show Cause hearing.

And second, following Appellant's filing of his

Motion to Dismiss, the Respondents still remained silent concerning
the terms of the Motion.

There were no pleadings of objection filed,

no letters or phone calls, nothing indicating that the State would
suddenly make a move to change the terms of the Motion from a routine
dismissal without prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice.

If grant-

ed by the Court, a dismissal with prejudice would mean, even though
there had been practically no litigation at all in this matter, that
the original claims would have no legal standing whatsoever.

It would

be res judicata, barred from the Courts forever.
On the morning of June 7, 1993, Appellant appeared in Court along
with counsel for the Respondents, Carol Verdoia.

However, what seemed

a little odd, was the fact there was practically nobody else in the
courtroom.

As the Transcript indicates on the top of page 3, the

first thing Judge Medley said after entering the courtroom was:
"Letfs go to the No. 2 matter on the calendar, Slater vs. State of
Utah, Case No. 920903097."
Moving to line 8 of the Transcript on page 3, THE COURT: Mr. Slater, this is your Motion to Dismiss, sir?
MR. SLATER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is there anything else you want to add other than
what is stated in the written pleadings that I have had a chance to
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read?
MR. SLATER: No, I think it is sufficient in my Motion to Dismiss,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Verdoia.
MS. VERDOIA: I guess the only thing I would ask in a situation
like this, do you normally dismiss without prejudice or -THE COURT: In this particular situation, I would be dismissing
the matter with prejudice.
MS. VERDOIA: That is what I would have requested.
Before quoting from the Transcript any further, there are some
important questions that must be asked relating to the above exchange.
What did Judge Medley mean when he said, "In this 'particular' situation, I would be dismissing the matter 'with' prejudice."

What was

so particular about this dismissal that justified the imposition of
such a severe sanction?

What did Ms. Verdoia mean when she said, "That

is what I 'would' have requested."

"Would" have requested?

The fact

is, counsel for the Respondents did not request that Appellant's case
be dismissed with prejudice, by either a written pleading or in person in Court.
on May 19.

Ms. Verdoia did not appear at the Show Cause hearing

Therefore, when Appellant explained to Judge Medley on

the 19th that he intended to file a Motion to Dismiss his action,
neither the Court nor Appellant had any idea of whether this would
be agreeable to the Respondents, because counsel for the State failed
to appear.

However, Ms. Verdoia had received Appellant's Motion to

Dismiss "without" prejudice at least 2 weeks or more prior to the
hearing on the Motion set for June 7.

Still no word from the Respon-

dents, either verbally or in writing, as to any adverse position the
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State would take in opposition to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss.
Regarding attorneys and matters in litigation, we all know when
representing a client it is the duty of the attorney to employ the
tactics which are in the best interest of the client.

Given the

foregoing, it may have been Ms.Verdoia's idea to object to Appellant's Motion, using these vague tactics, (MS.VERDOIA: That is what
I "would" have requested), or, on the other hand, this clever little
maneuver could have been engineered by Ms.Verdoia's superiors.
In any event, that issue really makes little or no difference
because the final decision in legal disputes rests with the Court.
Just as it is the responsibility and duty of a lawyer to fully represent the best interests of his or her client, the Court has a much
greater responsibility, and duty, to remain impartial in protecting
the interests of both parties on an equal basis.
pragmatic terms, mean judges.

And Courts, in

In this instance, Judge Tyrone Medley.

Returning to the Transcript, it becomes vividly clear that here
was a layman, a person unfamiliar with the rules of courtroom procedure, attempting to plead what he believed were important points
in behalf of his position, but in vain, because the matter had already been decided!

Beginning on page 3, line 25, it reads as

follows:
MR. SLATER: Well, Your Honor, I request that it be dismissed
without prejudice because I feel I was very sincere in filing this
action and justified in filing this action, rather than just let the
Court dismiss it as so many were here on the 19th-THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Mr. Slater.
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I think

this gets to the heart of the issue.

This is your lawsuit and you

are asking the Court to dismiss it, correct?
MR. SLATER: That is correct.
THE COURT: And what I am understanding from your request to have
it dismissed at this time, Mr. Slater, is simply that you don't

intend

to re-file this case, do you?
MR. SLATER: I don't intend to re-file this action, this particular action now, but it could be possibly a similar action some time
in the future.

As I mentioned in the motion, it is because of my

income and I don't seek any further assistance from the state at this
time.

And I'd just like to say, Your Honor, that -THE COURT: Mr. Slater, this is the point I am trying to get at

and this is really not that complicated.

You are asking the Court

to dismiss this claim today, correct?
MR. SLATER: Correct.
THE COURT: Are you telling me that at some future date you think
you intend to bring this claim again?

This exact claim, not something

that may happen in the future, but this claim?
MR. SLATER: There is a possibility

that the same kind of action

could be filed later if the state and the case workers for the state
were to take a similar action against me in the future.
THE COURT: But that would be some future event and not this particular date alleged in the claim that is filed in this particular
case.

That would be some future event, correct?
MR. SLATER: That is correct.
MS. VERDOIA: And Mr. Slater won't be prohibited from filing an

action based on a future claim.
THE COURT: That is the point I am getting at.
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The dismissal

with prejudice, Mr. Slater, doesn't mean that you can't bring some
future claim at a future date.

It doesn't preclude you from access

to the court for future events.
MR. SLATER: The same kind of action is judicial review of an
administrative order.

That is what the original petition was.

THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Slater, but the dismissal with prejudice does not operate as a bar for you to bring some future event,
sir.
MR. SLATER: I would like to add, Your Honor, that I felt that
since so many of these are dismissed out of hand, that the Court may
feel, as I saw in your Order to Show Cause hearings on the 19th,
that there are so many of them dismissed that it would appear that
some of these suits may be filed frivolously.

I don't consider this

a frivolous suit and I don't want the Court to consider that and
that is why I filed the Motion to Dismiss.
THE COURT: Mr. Slater, your impressions are mistaken.

When you

appeared at the Order to Show Cause calendar, when those cases were
dismissed for the parties' failure to appear, I passed no judgment
whatsoever on the merits of the claims of those lawsuits.

It is just

the mere fact that the parties did not prosecute the action.
So this case today, as I indicated, is dismissed.
missed with prejudice.

It is dis-

That does not operate as a bar for you having

access to the courts for any future event that may or may not take
place.

(Emphasis added above)

MR. SLATER: If I may just add one final thought to present, Your
Honor.

When I called your office to file a Notice of Motion to get

the date, I asked about that very thing from your secretary or one of
the staff members in your office, if those cases that were dismissed
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on the Show Cause day that I appeared, I asked if those were dismissed with or without prejudice and I was told that the vast majority
of those are dismissed without prejudice.

So I feel, Your Honor,

that if I hadn't even appeared, it is quite possible this could have
been dismissed without prejudice; and then I filed the motion to do
it sincerely and in the best interest.
more paperwork involved, but --

I know there is a little

(Emphasis added)

THE COURT: Well, the ruling is standing, Mr. Slater, because as
you indicated, the only opportunity that you would have that you are
even considering is some future event.

And as I indicated to you,

you are not precluded from filing some future action based on a
future event.

You are not precluded.

And so for that reason, Mr.

Slater, I am going to dismiss the matter and this particular case
will be dismissed with prejudice.
was non-meritorious.

That doesn't mean that your claim

It simply means that we are putting an end to

this particular claim that is contained in this particular file,
not anything in the future.

(Emphasis added)

MR. SLATER: Okay, thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Slater.
MS. VERDOIA: Would you like me to prepare an Order?
THE COURT: Please.
MS. VERDOIA: Thank you, Your Honor.

In reviewing this exchange between Appellant and Judge Medley,
Appellant was desperately trying to explain to the Judge that he had
placed his faith in the Court, that he didn't consider his suit to
be frivolous, and didn't want the Court to think that either.
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How-

ever, several factors had changed in recent months.

Appellant's

health and income had improved to the extent that he could avoid seeking any further assistance from the State at this time.
14 thru 19 on p. 4).

(See lines

Those were some of the reasons that Appellant

had decided to file a Motion to Dismiss, which was also stated in the
Motion which Judge Medley had read.

(See p. 3, line 13).

The evidence becomes conclusive right in the Transcript by simply reading Judge Medley's own words.

The matter in dispute had been

prejudged, settled before Appellant ever entered the courtroom.

The

case would be dismissed with prejudice in favor of the State of Utah
even though the State had filed nothing in the Court below seeking
such a dismissal!!

If the Respondents didn't openly press for a dis-

missal with prejudice, while Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss without prejudice, and then the Judge reverses the request of Appellant
and orders that the case will be dismissed with prejudice, isn't that
sufficiently compelling evidence that this case was not only prejudged,
but the decision was blatantly biased in favor of the State?
Appellant urges this Court to please study this Transcript.
is very short, only about 7 pages in length.

It

Nowhere in this document

does Judge Medley give any legal or logical reason for his Order to
Dismiss Appellant's case with prejudice.

What is even more convincing

in showing the Court's bias, is seen on p. 6, lines 10 thru 16 of the
Transcript:
THE COURT: Mr. Slater, your impressions are mistaken.

When you

appeared at the Order to Show Cause calendar, when those cases were
dismissed for the parties' failure to appear, I passed no judgment
whatsoever on the merits of the claims of those lawsuits.
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It is

just the mere fact that the parties did not prosecute the action. Followed by the Judge stating on lines 17 and 18: "So this case today,
as I indicated, is dismissed.
Why?

It is dismissed with prejudice."

Again, based on what logical or legal reason?

The Judge

had just finished saying, "I passed no judgment whatsoever on the
merits of the claims of those lawsuits.

It is just the mere fact

that the parties did not prosecute the action."

(In reference to

the scores of cases he had dismissed without prejudice on May 19).
What was the difference between the other cases and this case?
comparison is identical!

The

This case never went to the "merits of the

claims" made by Appellant prior to his Motion to Dismiss.

"It is

just the mere fact that the parties (also Appellant) did not prosecute the action."

Thus, Judge Medley issued a Show Cause Order to

this litigant just as he had to the other "parties" he refers to

on

lines 13 and 15, all of whose cases were dismissed without prejudice.
The Clerk's records from the Third District Court indicate that
Judge Medley's calendar consisted of seventy (70) cases scheduled to
appear at his Show Cause hearing set for May 19, 1993.

Appellant was

in attendance at those proceedings and watched and listened with considerable interest on that day prior to being called up as the 56th
case on the calendar.

Appellant observed case after case being cal-

led up by the Judge where neither party to the action appeared.
Appellant has counted some forty-five (45) out of the seventy (70)
cases scheduled to be heard to Show Cause on May 19 that were summarily dismissed because the parties failed to appear.

And accord-

ing to Appellant's reading of the record, Judge Medley dismissed
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every one of those forty-five (45) cases without prejudice.

This means

that the matter of Slater v. State of Utah was a very unique case as
it related to 45 other cases scheduled to be heard in Third District
Court by Judge Medley on May 19, 1993.

Slater was the only case to be

dismissed with prejudice out of 45 other cases dismissed without prejudice.

(Perhaps the only one out of 7J) others, since the final dis-

position would be decided later in the remaining cases).
Needless to say, if a litigant stands alone as one out of 45 or
one in 70, the odds of being singled out to this degree by a Court of
law for such a severe sanction so completely unwarranted is almost beyond belief.
Appellant's attempt to explain to Judge Medley about his reasoning to file a Motion to Dismiss, when appearing on May 19, must have
seemed a bit pathetic to the practicing lawyers who were still in
the courtroom —

if not a joke.

(Could that be the reason for only

2 cases being scheduled for the morning of June 7?).
The bottom line to all of the foregoing is simply this: When Appellant was issued a Court Order to Show Cause, he obeyed that Order
and showed up —

and explained to the Court what he intended to do

he would, for sound reasons, not press his Petition further.

—

Instead,

he would move to dismiss his case from the active Court files.
Appellant had every reason to believe that he was doing the right
thing.

The Court was endeavoring to resolve one of its pending cases,

and Appellant was cooperating by appearing and showing just cause as
ordered.

Without being schooled in the law, or holding membership in

the local Bar Assn., how was Appellant supposed to know that when
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lawyers or their clients change their minds about pursuing a legal
action, one very easy way out is by simply failing to appear at a
Show Cause hearing.

Presto, the case is over with and no one suffers

any lasting damage.

(However, the vast majority of citizens would

agree with Appellant regarding these kinds of "quick-fixes", perhaps
not as they specifically relate to dismissals, but in most pleabargaining schemes, such shortcuts tend to undermine the entire judiciary.

For example, plea-bargaining in the criminal justice system,

particularly in New York City, has become a mockery!).
When Appellant appeared before Judge Medley the first time on
May 19, it should have been fully apparent to him, (and undoubtedly
was), that here was a prose litigant who is going about this matter
entirely the wrong way.

Appellant submits that, as a presiding jurist

in one of this State's District Courts, Judge Medley had a solemn duty
to protect the rights of this prose litigant and not permit, let alone
endorse and Order such a miscarriage of justice as took place in his
courtroom on June 7, 1993.

Such an abuse of discretion would not have

been attempted if Appellant had been represented by competent counsel.
Does this mean that all litigants who cannot afford to be represented
by a lawyer are doomed to fall victim to a biased and prejudicial legal
system?

It is a sad day for this country if that has become the pre-

vailing standard.
"It seems anomalous and unfair that a plaintiff who, when notified
of the impending dismissal of his case, moved promptly (though unsuccessfully) to avoid the penalty, should find himself, by defendant's
belated action, in a worse position than if he had done nothing and
permitted his action to be dismissed without protest."
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Once again

quoting a pertinent excerpt from Chief Federal Judge Kirkpatrick's
noteworthy decision in the Ordnance Gauge case, supra, 21 F.R.D. at
p. 577 (E.D. Penn.1958).

An important passage from Circuit Judge Mc

Laughlin's opinion in Peardon v. Chapman, supra, also deserves repeating at this point: "Based on the Court's first expression it would
seem that appellant anticipated nothing more drastic than a dismissal
without prejudice.

With no warning of the Court's uncommunicated

change of thought as to dismissal, she was not afforded an opportunity
See 169 F.2d at p. 913 (3rd Cir. f 48).

of protecting her cause of action."

Case law teaches that if Appellant had foreseen the impending
sanction about to be imposed, he could have avoided such an adverse
measure by simply filing a Motion for a second Scheduling Conference
and then press the case forward.

That would certainly have been a

better alternative than suddenly looking down the barrel of a Courtordered Dismissal with prejudice!

But nine out of ten prose liti-

gants would be completely unaware of such legal maneuvers, with this
Appellant among the majority —

at least he was at the outset of this

dismissal litigation.
SUMMARY
What follows is a list of the major points in support of Appellant's position presented in this appeal:
(1) The State filed no opposition to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss "without" prejudice.
to the Court hearing.

No objection was raised in writing prior

Even then, the first mention of a dismissal

"with" prejudice came from Judge Medley, not counsel for the Respondents.

Therefore, Appellant was caught completely by surprise, un-

prepared to present either case law or cite other legal authority
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when the Court permitted little or no time for an adequate rebuttal
or argument in support of Appellant's position. (See TRANSCRIPT, S e e l
in Addendum).
(2) This case never reached the merits, a vitally important
factor totally disregarded by the Court below.
(3) The State submitted no pleadings other than its Answer. Thus,
the record reveals that the State was under no burden or any pressure
from Appellant throughout these proceedings. (See DOCKET REPORT, Sec.
6 in Addendum).
(4) Why should Appellant be made a victim for voluntarily moving
to dismiss his suit and doing so without prejudice when the Respondents had suffered no harm as a result of the action?
(5) If the Courts are permitted to penalize a plaintiff whenever
he or she voluntarily moves for an early dismissal of a legal action,
particularly at the threshold of a case prior to discovery or any
further litigation in the matter, does that not constitute a direct
threat to a citizen's right to "Petition the Government" which is
guaranteed in the First Amendment?

Is it not also a denial of "Due

Process" mandated under the Fourteenth Amendment if res judicata is
imposed following a Dismissal with prejudice that was unwarranted?
(6) The Court below arbitrarily chose to dismiss this case "with"
prejudice although, during a Show Cause hearing where Appellant appeared as ordered, some 45 cases were summarily dismissed without
prejudice simply because the parties failed to appear at the hearing!
(7) Why should the parties in 45 other cases be granted dismissals without prejudice by Court Order, simply because in the ma-
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jority of those cases neither party bothered to show up as ordered
by the Court, while Appellant took the time and effort to file a
Motion with the Court to dismiss his action, stating sound reasons
and just cause for not pursuing the matter any further at this time,
all of which was done in good faith and in compliance with all of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, both State and Federal?
(8) And yet the Court chose to dismiss .Appellant's case "with"
prejudice —

a judicial action taken in only one out of 45 cases on

the same day's Court calendar.

Is such a decision not discriminatory?

Is it not a violation of "Equal Protection" of the laws as mandated
in the Fourteenth Amendment?
(9) If the lower Court's decision in this matter was not an
abuse of judicial discretion, then surely it must fall within the
category of a "misuse of judicial authority", and subject to reversal
on appeal.
(10) Appellant can see no justification in the Court below ordering that this case be dismissed "with" prejudice, other than it taking
an overly protective position in behalf of the Respondents.

But such

judicial adversity directed toward the Petitioner in this matter was
completely unwarranted.

Surely, this Court must conclude, even though

the Court below did not, that this working-class citizen of only modest means, was no match in a Court of law against all of the power
and resources of the Respondents, namely, the State of Utah and two
administrative agencies therein.

The duty of the trial Court was to

be unbiased and show no favoritism to either side, regardless of rank
or financial position of the parties involved.
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CONCLUSION
"The courts have frequently warned that 'dismissal with prejudice
is a drastic sanction to be applied only in extreme situations.1 Indeed
there are constitutional limitations upon the power of a court, even
in aid of its own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause.
For this reason the appellate courts scrutinize very carefully dismissals with prejudice made on these grounds.

They have allowed dismissal

with prejudice 'only in the face of a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff,' or, as another court put it, 'upon
a serious showing of willful default.'
For these reasons the courts hold that 'except in extreme circumstances , the court should first resort to the wide range of lesser
sanctions which it may impose upon the litigant or the derelict attorney, or both,' before ordering dismissal with prejudice.

Frequently,

probably usually, failure to comply with an order of the court, or
with the rules, or failure to prosecute will be the fault of the attorney rather than the party.

But it is entirely clear that the party

cannot avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of his freely
chosen attorney.

At the same time a host of cases evidence the re-

luctance of the courts to bar a party from trial on the merits of his
claim because of the errors of his legal representatives.

In such

situations, either on the original motion to dismiss or on a motion
to vacate the dismissal, the courts frequently have found that less
drastic sanctions, such as dismissal without prejudice or putting the
case at the foot of the calendar, would be adequate." (Emphasis added)
(See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol.9, Ch.7,
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"Dismissal of Actions", Section 2369 at pages 193 thru 197).
Section 11 under Article I of the Constitution of Utah, titled,
"Courts open —

Redress of injuries," reads as follows:

"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party,"
Appellant takes tills Section of Utah's Constitution literally
just as it was written.

The forthright language makes it obvious that

the Legislators who wrote and voted for this provision to become part
of the Constitutional law of the State, did so to insure that Courts
under State jurisdiction should be prevented from riding rough-shod
over Utah's citizens seeking justice in the State judicial system.
The last part of Section 11 deserves a second reading: ". . .and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, . ."

By including these

words, the Legislature was making it clear that nobody was to be barred from full access to the Courts of this State, either with or
without an attorney.
course of law. . ."

". . .every person . .shall have remedy by due
(Emphasis added)

When Article I, Section 11, of Utah's Constitution is coupled
with the Right to Petition, guaranteed under the First Amendment, and
then with the Equal Protection and Due Process provisions mandated
in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, Appellant
firmly believes that he is fully supported by, not only the Constitu-31-

tional provisions of this State, but also by the mandates set forth
in the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the basic laws of this country.

All of these laws, which are fundamental, are in place to pro-

tect the rights of individual citizens going before our Courts
both State and Federal —

—

to guarantee an unbiased, full and fair

hearing of disputes in contention —

which this citizen was denied.

Abuse of Discretion
Whenever the record reveals that a Court has invoked certain
legal moves that are manipulative in behalf of one side in a case,
and particularly when the losing litigant is prose, usually lacking
courtroom skills or a full knowledge of the law, especially those
procedural ploys known only among practicing lawyers and the Courts,
can it be candidly claimed that our system of justice is fair and
unbiased?

Or, at times do the facts in some cases make it obvious

beyond a shadow of a doubt, that a Court has taken advantage of a
litigant who had depended upon the CourtTs integrity and authority
to protect his or her Constitutional rights?
When that trust is broken through such clandestine, legal maneuvers, can a Court legitimately defend itself against the charge of
abuse of judicial discretion?

The lower Court's dismissal of Ap-

pellant's action with prejudice must be reversed —
no less.
DATED this /

*7 ~

day of December, 1993.
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justice demands
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